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Abstract 
To select one of several products (or to buy nothing) is a daily decision. Its 
foundations vary from one person to another and are based on perceptions, preferences, and 
other criteria. The standard theoretical perspective conveys that people choose options with 
the highest net benefit. However, the zero price model, proposed by Shampanier, Mazar, and 
Ariely (SMA) (2007), suggests that decisions about free (zero price) products do not simply 
subtract costs from benefits but instead perceive other gains and costs associated with free 
products.  
This paper tests this second alternative by contrasting demand for telecommunication 
products in Morocco, mainly SMS and calls. The price difference is maintained between the 
cheaper and expensive options such that the cheaper product is priced at either a low positive 
price (cost condition) or zero price (free condition).  The results suggest that more participants 
choose the cheaper option, whereas fewer participants choose the more expensive one. People 
act as if zero pricing is a special price, as suggested by the zero price model. The paper tests 
also the affect as an explanation to the zero price effect. The result suggests that the price 
effect cannot be fully attributed to this dimension.  
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Introduction 
The concept of zero has been used to understand many aspects of decision making.  
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) indicate that when it comes to gambles, people perceive zero 
probability differently than they do for small positive ones. The concept of zero is not 
perceived differently only in probabilities but in other domains. Shampanier, Mazar, and 
Ariely (SMA), examine zero pricing as a positively perceived price. It demonstrates that when 
people are faced with a choice between two products, one of which is free, they overreact to 
the free product as if zero price means not only a low cost of buying the product, but also its 
increased valuation.  
Nowadays, zero pricing has been increasingly developing in Morocco and related 
offers have been introduced in many sectors. One good example is the detergent sector in 
which competitors launch several promotions, offering additional amounts of detergents for 
free. Brands such as OMO, TIDE and ARIEL offer promotions starting from + 16% to +30% 
free additional amounts (Online advertising, 2009-2010). Another example of zero pricing in 
Morocco is from the automotive industry in which Renault offers maintenance and 
accessories for free (Online Advertising, 2010). In the same context, operators in the 
telecommunication sector use similar strategies. Via its website, the operator “Meditel” offers 
its clients the prospect of sending up to 10 SMS/day for free.  Similarly, “IAM” offers the 
same promotion to its customers with the possibility of sending up to 20 SMS/day.  Such 
zero-price offers are mainly devoted to boost  sales of products and services. In traditional 
economics, decreasing prices to zero automatically lead to a huge boost in the sales of free 
products and services.   
Arnold (2010) demonstrates that people tend to buy more products or services that 
maximize the marginal utility over price (MU/P). Relatively, as the price of a good or service 
goes down, demand for such product goes up and therefore sales go up.  In the same context, 
Ariely (2008) demonstrates that free options induce higher demand. However, the question 
that arises is whether such findings can be expanded to other contexts and areas.  
The objective of this paper is to investigate whether zero prices and free products lead 
to higher demand in the context of the Moroccan telecommunication sector. The paper tests 
also for potential antecedents of this zero price effects.  
As such, the current study focuses on the telecommunication sector in Morocco.  It 
does not deal with pricing of telecommunications as this can be found in the seminal papers of 
Artle and Averous (1973), Rohlfs, J. (1974) and Squire L. (1973). Furthermore, these 
contributions have been strengthened later by other authors with the increasing number of 
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competitors in each domestic market of telecommunication ( Laffont
 
J.J, Rey P. and Tirole J., 
1998; Hausman, A.J, 1997; Peitz, M., 2003; Gruber H. and Verboven F., 2004). But, further 
papers have been concerned with marketing strategies in the telecommunications sector. 
These include the contributions of Danaher, P.J., (2002) and of Stremersch, S., and Tellis, 
G.J., (2002) that have started dealing with pricing of new subscriptions and bundling of 
services. The first author uses a sample of potential residential customers divided into four 
groups. The first group is not charged an access fee but has to pay a small per-minute usage. 
The second group also pays a small usage charge but in addition, has three access price 
increases over the trial. The third group pays no access fee but has usage charge increases, 
while the fourth group has both access fee and usage charge increases. Usage levels for each 
respondent are recorded, as is their month of dropout if they discontinue the services. The data 
shows that higher access fees result in higher customer attrition, and higher usage cost results 
in lower usage. Furthermore, usage and retention are related in that declining usage levels 
over time often signal impending customer attrition. The second author focuses mainly on 
bundling of telecommunication services and the likely promising marketing strategies.  
                 The current paper looks at the likely bonuses that accompany the on-going 
telecommunication deals and that are most of the time, provided as free or at zero prices. This 
practice is becoming pervasive among the telecommunication operators that continuously 
provide limited or continuous access to series of free services that can be accessed through the 
phone system and through the Internet.  
The paper is composed of four paragraphs. It starts with a literature review.  This is 
followed with the theoretical framework. The empirical analysis and results are then 
introduced. The last paragraph focuses on the discussion of the attained results. 
 
I. Literature Review 
The concept of zero has played a major role in the understanding of several aspects of 
human behavior and decisions. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) shows that getting a zero 
reward is perceived as highly positive compared to receiving a small positive reward. Other 
literature suggests that changing a reward from something to nothing (or to zero) has a 
positive impact on people’s motivation, self-perception and feelings of competence and 
control (Deci and Ryan 1985). For instance, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) suggest that in the 
case of money collection for charity, performance for the zero reward is much greater than 
when a small reward is mentioned. Accordingly, Heyman and Ariely (2004) demonstrate that 
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people use market norms when prices are mentioned, while they apply social norms when 
prices are not mentioned (zero price).  
In traditional economics, “free” implies that there are no additional costs to an 
individual while transaction is, associated with accrued costs to purchasers. However, the free 
products represent operating costs for producers or even externalities for society. Hence, 
every transaction has costs associated with it, and while some consumers may appear to be 
benefitting from zero prices, someone else is paying these costs. As Milton Friedman (1990) 
indicates "there is no such thing as free lunch". In this context, Adam Smith conveys, in his 
book “wealth of nations”, that when a voluntary exchange between two parties occurs, it 
automatically means that both parties are benefiting from it. So, many economic 
misconceptions and anomalies might be caused by the neglect of these simple insights. 
Accordingly, free products can be used to achieve a variety of objectives, including test a 
product, increase marketing awareness and competition.  
 Revealed preference theory
1
, pioneered by Paul Samuelson (1938), is a method by 
which it is possible to distinguish the best possible option on the basis of consumer behavior. 
This suggests that the preferences of consumers can be understood via their purchasing habits. 
While utility maximization is not a controversial theory, the underlying utility functions could 
not be measured with great certainty. Revealed preference theory brings together with the 
demand theory via creating means to define utility functions by observing behavior. 
 Sippel, R. (1997) discusses whether consumer demand satisfies the axioms of revealed 
preference, and suggests further testing the empirical validity of the neoclassical theory of 
consumer behavior. The author recognizes that applying the axiom to actual consumer 
purchase data is difficult, if not impossible, since it poses serious problems of both a 
methodological and a practical nature. After commenting on the few existing empirical 
studies in this field, a summary of the results from an experimental approach to revealed 
preference theory is provided. Data are obtained from a controlled experiment involving real 
                                                            
1
 A utility function V(x) rationalizes the choice x if at the given prices; the chosen level of consumption induces 
satisfaction that is at least as high as any other available choice. More normally, if prices are given by tp
i
 = (p1
i
, 
p2
i, ..., pn
i), and if the chosen consumption levels of goods 1, 2, ..., n are xi = (x1
i, x2
i, ..., xn
i), then u(xi)  u(x) for 
any consumption level x such that p
i
 x
i
  p
i
 x. When x
i
 is chosen and p
i
 x
i
  p
i
 x so that x is an available choice, 
it is said hat x
i
 is directly revealed preferred to x. This is written as x
i
 R
 
x. Under these conditions, a variety of 
situations have been described in the literature of choice. 
 5 
consumption. The author concludes that most subjects violated the basic axioms of revealed 
preferences.  
 
This latter direction of theory can be used for a first economic model, or the standard 
cost-benefit model stating that zero is just another price, so reducing one of the prices to 0 is 
just like any other price reduction, and hence it should not create any exceptional advantage. 
The standard cost-benefit model suggests that when faced with selecting between two 
products (X and Y for example), the customer choose product X if and only if the value of 
product X is greater than the value of product Y, and the difference between the value and the 
price of product X is greater than the difference between the value and the price of product Y 
(as shown in equation 1). Similarly, the customer chooses product Y if and only if the value of 
product Y is greater than the value of  X, and the difference between the value and the price 
of product Y is greater than the difference between the value and the price of product X (as 
shown in equation 2). The customers do not choose any product if the prices of both X and Y 
prices surpass the values of X and Y respectively (as indicated in equation 3). 
 
X XV P>     and  X X Y YV P V P− > −                                  (1) 
Y YV P>     And  Y Y X XV P V P− > −                                  (2) 
X XV P<     And   Y YV P<                                                (3) 
The cost-benefit model suggests, as well, that even when prices are reduced to zero or 
to another small price, consumers choose X only if the value of X is greater than the new 
price of X, and the difference between the value and the price of product X is greater than the 
difference between the value and the price of product Y (as shown in equation 4). Likewise, 
customers choose Y only if the value of Y exceeds the new reduced price of Y, and the 
difference between the value and the price of product Y is greater than and the difference 
between the value and the price of product X (as shown in equation 5). Finally, customers 
choose to buy nothing if the prices of X and Y respectively are greater than the values of X 
and Y (as indicated in equation 6). 
X XV P ε> −  and X X Y YV P V P− > −                                    (4) 
Y YV P ε> −  and Y Y X XV P V P− > −                                     (5)   
X XV P ε< −  and Y YV P ε< −                                               (6) 
Hence, based on this last model, a reduction of a price to zero will have the same 
effect of reduction of another price by the same amount while the price is still positive. 
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Actually, the study of SMA (2007) suggests opposite findings. It demonstrates that under the 
zero price condition, people dramatically choose the cheaper option (zero price product), 
which it is not the case for reduced positive prices. Thus people are likely to treat the zero-
price as an exceptional price that is associated with higher benefits. 
This second model (the zero-price model), suggests that a price of zero is highly 
attractive. Hence, a price reduction from a positive price to a zero price creates a boost in the 
attractiveness of the free product and its relative demand. This proposes that zero prices are 
positively perceived by customers, and hence demand for such a product is higher. The paper 
tests this hypothesis by contrasting demand for two products across cost and free conditions in 
the context of the Moroccan telecommunication sector. Under each condition, prices for the 
products are different such that the cheaper good in the two conditions is priced at either a low 
positive or a zero price.  
Zero pricing might also have a negative effect on demand in some cases. In this 
context, Ariely et al. (2006) show that students took 4 pieces of Starburst candy when priced 
at 1¢ per piece, while more students took the candy, but almost no one took more than one 
piece when priced at zero. Hence, zero prices in this case had negative effect on the demand 
for the Starburst candy. Indeed, such economic anomalies cannot be explained through 
traditional economic theory because they are related to individuals’ behaviors. One good 
alternative to understand such behaviors is the use of experimental approach or simply 
randomized experiments. The main quality of randomized experiments is that they allow the 
estimation of parameters that would not otherwise be possible to evaluate. The experimental 
approach allows also close collaboration between researchers and implementers, and hence 
leads to more efficient results.  Randomized experiments are experiments that allow a 
significant reliability and validity of statistical estimates (Banerjee & Duflo, 2009). Such 
approach has been widely used recently in development economics and has made valuable 
contributions in experimental work in economics. Randomized experiments can be a good 
alternative for multiple cases in which there is a lack of economic data or a lack of causality 
pattern among variables. One of the main advantages of the experimental approach is that it 
makes it possible for experimenters to vary one aspect at a time, and so results are more 
applicable. The experimental approach can be also useful for decision makers in cases where 
it is challenging to make decisions based on the observational approach or on prior-
knowledge. Such approach allows the implementation of multiple experiments at the same 
time for the same population. In the same context, these experiments allow the 
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implementation of a dynamic learning in order to build a reliable set of data. They make it 
possible for researchers to reach an optimal learning, in a way that tests the global effect first 
then goes into the details of the single components. Randomized experiments are reliable 
instruments that allow researchers to test theories and strengthen them by strong and sufficient 
sets of data. 
 
II. Theoretical Model 
 SMA (2007) suggests that the “zero price” is a special price because it is associated 
with higher levels of demand for the free product. They suggest also that decisions about free 
(zero price) products differ, in that people do not simply subtract costs from benefits (as in the 
cost-benefit analysis), but instead perceive the benefits associated with free products as 
higher. In order to test this hypothesis, the authors contrast demand for two products across 
cost conditions and free conditions throughout a set of experiments. The cost condition 
includes a higher and a cheaper cost such that the cheaper cost is a low positive price. 
Relatively, the free condition includes similarly two prices, but the cheaper product is priced 
at zero. The authors propose and test also several psychological antecedents of the effect, 
including social norms, mapping difficulty, and affect via questionnaires and experiments. 
As stated earlier, SMA (2007) starts with two models, one that treats zero as just 
another price and one that presumes that free options are evaluated more positively by 
consumers. First, the authors test the validity of the zero price model via mainly, three 
experiments.  Experiment 1 provides the initial evidence of the zero-price model via 
questionnaires that contradict the cost and free condition for two brands of chocolate.  In 
experiment 2, the authors use a real buying scenario to support the zero-price effect. The 
results suggest that the effect is not due to decision making based on cost–benefit ratios. 
Experiment 3 is also a real buying scenario with results suggesting that the zero price effect 
could not be due to physical transaction costs. 
 After demonstrating the validity of the zero price model in the first three experiments, 
the authors propose and examine three psychological mechanisms that might be leading to the 
effect of zero pricing. These mechanisms include: social norms, mapping difficulty, and 
affect. The social norms explanation, on the basis of findings (Heyman and Ariely, 2004), 
suggests that when prices are mentioned, customers use market-based transaction norms for 
selection of products, whereas social norms are used when prices are not revealed.  In order to 
test for social norms, the authors use negative prices that involve prices but no cost as a third 
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condition. The results suggest that, in contrast with the social exchange norms explanation, 
the zero-price effect remains even when money is mentioned in both options in the choice set. 
The other step is to test for the other two possible explanations: mapping difficulty and affect.  
Mapping difficulty proposes that people have difficulty mapping their expected utility 
into monetary terms. Experiment 4 tests the mapping difficulty explanation via the exchange 
of a quantity of chocolate by another quantity of chocolate or by nothing (free condition). The 
results indicate that even when there is no use of monetary terms, people show higher interest 
in free products. This conveys that the zero price effect is not explained by the mapping 
difficulty. The last two experiments examine the “Affective” evaluation assumption. The 
affect explanation suggests that options with no cost invoke a more positive affective 
response. This affective reaction is used as the basis for decision making before choosing the 
free option. Experiment 5 includes a questionnaire that evaluates consumers’ satisfaction with 
the four options under the cost and free conditions. The results suggest that subjects 
experience higher positive affect when facing a free offer compared with the other 
alternatives.  In Experiment 6, SMA (2007) tests whether forcing customers to evaluate the 
options cognitively, and thereby making these evaluations available and accessible, eliminates 
the zero-price effect. For this purpose, two samples of questionnaires are used. The first 
sample controls for the affective valuation via two questions, so that respondents make their 
choices cognitively. The second sample of questionnaires does not include the above items so 
that the affect valuation is still present. The results suggest that when respondents have access 
to available inputs, they make their choices cognitively, and the attractiveness of zero price 
largely disappears. Based on these results, SMA (2007) proposes that the zero-price effect 
might be better explained by affective evaluations rather than by the social norms or mapping 
difficulty. 
 
III. Empirical Methods and Related Results 
 In order to test whether people are attracted more by free products or zero pricing, this 
paper measures the reaction to zero prices through a series of experiments.  The paper 
employs a method that contrasts two choice situations (cost and free condition). So, the basic 
structure of the two first experiments is as follows: All subjects may choose from four 
options: buy a low-value product (Meditel Call or SMS), buy a higher-value product (IAM 
call or SMS), buy a medium-value product (INWI call or SMS), or buy “nothing”. The 
variation across conditions that enables us to measure their reaction to the price of zero relies 
on two basic conditions: “cost” and “free.” In the cost condition, the prices of all products are 
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positive. Under the free condition, all prices are reduced by the same amount, so that the 
cheaper good becomes free.  
 All experiments are made on the Moroccan telecommunication sector, mainly on calls 
and SMS of the three telecom operators: IAM
2
, Meditel
3
, and WANA
4
. The first two 
experiments consist of questionnaires about SMS and calls.   
 
III.1: Attractiveness of zero-price 
This is conducted through experiments 1 and 2 as described below. The related results are 
also introduced and discussed.  
1. Experiment 1:  
109 participants made a theoretical choice among using an SMS service of Itissalat 
Almaghrib, Meditel, Inwi, or not using the SMS service offered (buying nothing). Across the 
three conditions, the prices of the SMS decrease by a constant amount (0.20 MAD). In the 
cost condition, the prices are 0.56 MAD per SMS for IAM, 0.20 MAD per SMS for Meditel, 
and 0.35 MAD per SMS for INWI. The fourth choice is to not choose any offer and check 
“nothing”.  In the free condition, the prices are reduced by 0.20 MAD so that they become 
0.36 MAD per SMS for IAM, 0.00 MAD per SMS for Meditel (zero price), and 0.15 MAD 
per SMS for INWI. An additional condition is mentioned in order to contrast the 0.20 MAD 
reduction that includes zero price (free condition) to 0.20 MAD reduction that does not 
include a zero price. This third condition is also a cost condition in which prices are as 
follows: 0.76 MAD per SMS for IAM, 0.40 MAD per SMS for Meditel, and 0.55 MAD per 
SMS for INWI. In the three conditions, the option of buying “nothing” is included. 
The participants are from both genders (as shown in figure 1 in appendix 1). They 
have different ages (as shown in figure 2 in appendix 1), and they are students and staff at Al 
                                                            
2
 Morocco Telecom, or IAM, is the main telecommunications company in Morocco. It was privatized in 2001, and became a 
subsidiary of Vivendi, which owns 53% share of its capital. IAM is the historical leader in the telecommunications market in 
Morocco with more than 60% market share in mobile phone sector, and nearly 90% market share in terms of fixed line and 
Internet sectors (2010). 
3
 Meditel obtained the second license of mobile telephony in Morocco in 1999. It began its commercial operations on March 
29, 2000. With more than 23 million users (2010), Meditel is the second Moroccan mobile operator. The company offers also 
3G internet services in the Moroccan market. 
4
Starting January 1, 2007, INWI, formerly Wana, became the third mobile operator in Morocco. It markets its products and 
services under the brand Inwi for GSM and 3G internet and under the brand Bayn for fixed for limited mobility telephony. 
INWI had over 5 million clients in the mobile segment, and more than 2 million clients in the fixed line sector in 2010. 
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Akhawayn University in Ifrane (as shown in figure 3 in appendix 1). Participants use also 
different mobile operators (as shown in the table 1). 
Table 1: Telecom operators used by respondents (SMS) 
SMS Questionnaire   
Respondents Operator Number of respondents Percentage from the total  
IAM 57 52% 
INWI 20 18% 
MEDITEL 32 29% 
Total 109 100% 
  
As a first step, 20 surveys are distributed to test the applicability and the efficiency of the 
questionnaires. The first results suggest that the experiment could not be understood by 
respondents without a detailed explanation by the questionnaire distributors. Hence, the 109 
questionnaires distributed later are filled by the distributors through asking questions and 
explaining the experiment to respondents in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the 
experiment. 
2. Experiment 2:  
132 participants made a theoretical choice among using a call from one of the three 
operators: Itissalat Almaghrib, Meditel, Inwi, or not using the SMS service offered (buying 
nothing). Across the three conditions, the prices of the calls decreased by a constant amount 
(0.50 MAD). In the cost condition, the prices are 1.5 MAD a call/minute for IAM, 0.5 MAD a 
call/min for Meditel, and 1 MAD a call/minute for INWI. The fourth choice is to not choose 
any offer and check “nothing”.  In the free condition, the prices are reduced by 0.50 MAD so 
that the prices become 1 MAD a call/minute for IAM, 0.00 MAD a call/min for Meditel, and 
0.5 MAD a call/minute for INWI. An additional condition is added in order to contrast the 
0.50 MAD price reduction that does not include a zero price to a 0.50 MAD reduction that 
includes zero pricing (free condition). In this third cost condition, prices are as follows: 2 
MAD a call/minute for IAM, 1 MAD a call/min for Meditel, and 1.5 MAD a call/minute for 
INWI.  
As for the first experiment, the participants are from both genders (as shown in figure 
5 in appendix 2). They have different ages (as shown in figure 6 in appendix 2), and they are 
mainly students and staff at Alakhawayn University in Ifrane (as shown in figure 7 in 
appendix 1). Participants use different mobile operators as shown in table 2. 
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Table 2: Telecom operators used by respondents (Calls) 
Call questionnaire   
Operator Number of respondends Percentage of the total 
IAM 95 72% 
INWI 8 6% 
MEDITEL 29 22% 
TOTAL 132 100% 
 
 As for the SMS questionnaires, the 132 Call questionnaires distributed were 
filled by the distributors through asking questions and explaining the experiment to 
respondents in order to avoid biases in the experiment. 
 3.  Results  
These two experiments compare the choices respondents make when the prices for 
both options are discounted by the same amount and are still positive relative to a case in 
which both options are discounted by the same amount, yet the cheaper option becomes free 
(zero-price). These experiments make it possible to examine the reaction to free offers and 
show both an increase in demand for the cheaper product and a decrease in demand for the 
more expensive product. Thus, they confirm the hypothesis of the zero price model. 
Results of Experiment 1 
As indicated in table 3, as the prices decrease from 0.4 MAD per SMS to 0.2 MAD for 
the SMS of meditel, the demand increases slightly from 47% to 51 %. While, when the price 
of the Meditel SMS is reduced to a zero price, there is a boost in the demand for Meditel SMS 
so that it moves from 51% of respondents to 73% (as shown figure 4, appendix 1). For the 
other operators, even with price reductions, there was a drop in the demand for their SMS 
(demand for IAM SMS moved from 17% of respondents to 16% and then to 12%, while 
demand for INWI moves 12% to 11% in the cost conditions, and finally to 8% in the free 
condition). 
Thus, the (hypothetical) behavior of respondents in this paper is consistent with the 
zero-price model; participants react to the free product (the SMS of Meditel) as if it had 
additional value. 
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Table 3: Demand changes across conditions 
SMS     
Demands Offer 1 Offer 2 Offer 3 Standard deviation 
IAM 17% 16% 12% 2,80% 
inwi 12% 11% 8% 1,91% 
meditel 47% 51% 73% 14,22% 
NOTHING 24% 22% 6% 9,58% 
 
Results of Experiment 2 
As shown in table 4 bellow, as prices are reduced from 1 MAD a call/minute to 
0.5MAD a call/min for Meditel, the demand increases very slightly from 57% to 58 %. 
However, when the price of the call of Meditel decreases to zero, there was a higher increase 
in the demand for Meditel calls so that it moved from 58% of respondents to 62% (as shown 
in figure 8, appendix 1).  Regarding the other operators, even with price reductions, there was 
a drop in the demand for INWI calls (demand moved from 9% to 4% as a result of the 
reduction in the cost conditions, and then it moved to 2% in the free condition). For IAM, 
there was an increase in the demand as a result of the reduction from the higher to the lower 
cost condition (demand moves from 27% to 30%), while it stays stable in the free condition 
(demand stayed at 30%). Thus, the (hypothetical) behavior of respondents is consistent with 
the zero-price model; participants react to the free product (the call of Meditel) as if it had 
additional value. Even though, the increase in demand in the free condition for calls is not as 
significant as in the SMS case (4% increase in demand for the Call free condition, compared 
to 22% increase in demand as the cheaper prices are reduced to 0). 
Table 4: Demand changes across conditions 
Calls     
Demands Offer 1 Offer 2 Offer 3 Standard deviation 
IAM 27% 30% 30% 1.58% 
INWI 9% 4% 2% 3.58% 
MEDITEL 57% 58% 62% 2.73% 
Nothing  7% 8% 6% 0.76% 
 
4. Discussion of Results 
 As shown in figure 9, the results of the questionnaire conducted in SMA (2007) 
suggest that as they move from cost condition 1 to cost condition 2 via a reduction of 1 cent 
without including a zero price, there was a slight decrease in the demand for the cheaper 
product (it moved from 45% to 40%), while there was a stability in the demand for the 
expensive product (it remained 40%). For the second reduction that includes a zero price (free 
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condition), the results suggest that there is a boost in the demand for the cheaper product that 
is priced at zero in the free condition (the demand for the cheaper product moved from 40% in 
the cost condition to 90% in the free condition). For the expensive product, the demand drops 
from 40% to 10%, as prices are reduced to reach the free condition. 
 The results of this paper experiments are to some extent similar to SMA (2007) 
results. However, moving from the cost condition to the free condition does not have the same 
effect in both papers. SMA (2007) shows that there is a boost (an increase of 50%) in the 
demand as the cheaper product was priced at zero, and simultaneously a decline in the 
demand for the expensive product by about 30%. This is not the case for either of the two 
experiments in this paper. The results of the SMS questionnaire suggest that as prices move 
from the cost condition to the free condition, the demand for zero product increases by about 
22%. While for the call questionnaire, the demand for the cheaper product increases by just 
4%, as the price is reduced to 0. These results suggest that though the higher attitudes toward 
free options, a considerable portion of respondents choose other options rather than the free 
products. Such customers might be using other evaluation criteria when making their choices. 
Such difference between this study and the study SMA (2007) might be also caused by the 
difference between the testing products used. Choosing a chocolate is a much simpler 
decision than choosing an SMS or a call, and this might explain the higher attitude toward 
free options in the study of SMA (2007).  
III. 2: Why the zero price is attractive? 
 
  After demonstrating that zero price has a major role in consumers cost-benefit analysis 
and in their decision making relative to product selection, SMA (2007) explores the 
psychology behind the zero-price effect. It suggests three possible psychological explanations: 
Social norms, mapping difficulty, and Affect. On the basis of prior research and some 
additional experiments, SMA (2007) argues that social norms and mapping difficulty do not 
fully account for the zero price effect. It reveals also that the affect mechanism is a main 
cause of the zero price effect. The affect account consists of mainly two components. The first 
is that free offers evoke higher positive affect, and the second is that people use this affect as 
an input for their decision-making process. In order to test for the affect explanation, the 
authors mainly use two experiments. The first experiment tests the hypothesis that free offers 
elicit higher positive effect. In the second experiment, the SMA (2007) eliminates the zero 
price effect by removing the affect mechanism. To do so, they force people to evaluate the 
options cognitively and thereby making the evaluations available and accessible.    
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In order to test whether the affect explanation is really responsible for the zero price 
effect in the case of the Moroccan Telecom sector, experiments 3, 4, and 5 are conducted to 
examine whether the affective evaluation is a potential antecedent of the zero price effect.  
Results and their discussion are introduced below. 
1. Experiment 3 (SMS) 
50 participants are asked to evaluate how attractive they found an SMS offer at a 
certain price. The offer is manipulated on four levels among participants: an SMS of INWI for 
0 MAD (IN 0), an SMS of INWI for 0.5 (IN 0.5), an SMS of IAM or Meditel for 0.5 MAD 
(M 0.5), and an SMS of IAM or Meditel for 1 MAD (M 1). Participants are asked to choose 
their level of satisfaction about each offer on a scale from 1 to 5.  
If participants’ attitudes toward the offers are based on cost-benefit analysis, the 
attitudes toward M1 and IN0.5 should be slightly lower than those toward M0.5 and IN0, 
respectively; and the difference between the attitudes toward IN0.5 and IN0 should be similar 
to the difference between M1 and M0.5. However, the affect explanation suggests that the 
attitude toward IN0 should be much higher than that toward any other offer. 
2. Experiment 4 (calls) 
This questionnaire is quite similar to the questionnaire of experiment 3, except that it 
deals with “calls” instead of SMS. So, 50 participants are asked to evaluate the attractiveness 
of a call at a certain price. There are four offers: a call of INWI for 0 MAD/min (IN0), a call 
of INWI for 0.5 MAD/minute (IN0.5), a call of IAM or Meditel for 0.5 MAD/minute (M0.5), 
and a call of IAM or Meditel for 1 MAD/minute (M1). Participants are asked to choose their 
level of satisfaction about each offer on a scale from 1 to 5.  
Similarly, if respondents’ choices are based on a cost-benefit analysis, the attitudes 
toward M1 and IN0.5 should be slightly lower than those toward M0.5 and IN0, respectively; 
and the difference between the attitudes toward IN0.5 and IN0 should be similar to the 
difference between M1 and M0.5. However, if attitudes are based on the affect explanation, 
the attitude toward IN0 should be much greater than that toward the other offers. 
3. Results and discussion 
As shown in figure 10 and figure 11, the results of the two experiments confirm the 
affect hypothesis, so attitude toward the IN0 offer is higher than attitude toward the other 
offers. This supports the idea that the zero price offers provoke a larger positive affect than 
the standard cost–benefit analysis suggests. In fact, when people carefully consider the pros 
and cons of these offers, they might choose the expensive products even if they are associated 
with higher prices (Shampanier, Mazar, and Ariely, 2007).  
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Based on a t-test analysis (as shown in table 5), the results of experiment 3 suggest 
that the level of satisfaction of IN0 is significantly higher than any other offer (P-value < 0.05 
in all cases). Similarly, the results of experiment 4 (as shown in table 6) suggest that even for 
calls, people have higher attitudes toward IN0. These results convey that zero prices create a 
positive affective reaction within customers. One explanation to this positive affect is that the 
decision to take a free product is a much simpler decision. Experiment 5, tests whether this 
positive affect is used as a cue in decision making when buying products.   
Table 5: t--test Output (SMS) 
 Observations Means Difference of 
means 
T-test P-value 
IN0 
H0: IN0=IN05 
IN05 
50 
 
50 
4.76 
 
4.42 
 
0.34 
 
1.80 
 
0.0374 
IN0 
H0: IN0=M1 
M1 
50 
 
50 
4.76 
 
2.06 
2.7  
12.98 
 
0.00 
IN0 
H0: IN0=M05 
M05 
50 
 
50 
4.76 
 
1.8 
 
2.96 
 
14.29 
 
0.00 
 
Table 6: t-test Output (calls) 
 Observations Means Difference of 
means 
T-test P-value 
IN0 
H0: IN0=IN05 
IN05 
50 
 
50 
4.18 
 
3.54 
 
0.64 
 
2.23 
 
0.0140 
IN0 
H0: IN0=M1 
M1 
50 
 
50 
4.18 
 
3.22 
 
0.96 
 
3.46 
 
0.0004 
IN0 
H0: IN0=M05 
M05 
50 
 
50 
4.18 
 
3.42 
 
0.76 
 
2.82 
 
0.0029 
 
III. 3: Forced analysis 
As mentioned earlier, the affect mechanism is constituted of two parts. The first part is 
that free offers evoke higher positive affect, and the second is that people use this affect as an 
input for their decision-making process. In experiment 5, the paper tests whether consumers 
use this increased affect as a hint for later use in decision making, and so whether it leads to 
the zero price effect. The results of experiments 3 and 4 show a higher attitude toward the free 
products than toward any other product. This is consistent with the affect explanation of the 
zero price effect.  
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1. Experiment 5 
  Experiment 5 tests whether people use the affect as an input for decision making. To 
do so, participants are forced to non-affective decisions about the choice of products, so 
products are evaluated more cognitively. Two hundred participants take part of the 
experiment, and fill out a questionnaire in which they make a hypothetical choice among calls 
(100 questionnaires) and SMS (100 questionnaires).  For each set of questionnaires, half of 
the respondents (50 for Call questionnaires; and 50 for SMS questionnaires) are asked three 
questions before making their choices in order to control for affective evaluations. By doing 
so, participants are assumed to base their evaluations on cognitively available inputs and 
therefore they are expected to place lower weight on the affect mechanism. Such non-reliance 
on the affective evaluation might reduce the zero price effect.  
Two sets of questionnaires are filled by two hundred students and staff at Al 
Akhawayn University in Ifrane. The first set of questionnaires, composed of 100 
questionnaires, examines calls in the Moroccan telecommunication sector. Before making 
their hypothetical choices, half of the participants are asked three questions to control for the 
affective evaluation of the telecom offers. Participants are asked the following questions: “On 
a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (much more), how much more do you like making a call from 
INWI compared to making a call from IAM/ Meditel?”, “On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(much more) how much more would you hate paying 1 MAD in comparison with paying 0.5 
MAD?”,  and “On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (much more) how much more would you 
hate paying 0.5 MAD in comparison with paying 0 MAD (nothing)?”. Respondents circled a 
number from 1 to 7. After answering these questions, participants are asked to make 
hypothetical choice between three choices: INWI (calls are priced at 0.5 MAD/minute, then at 
0MAD/ minute), IAM/ Meditel (calls are priced at 1 MAD/minute, then at 0.5 MAD/ minute), 
or NOTHING. In the other half of the call questionnaires, there is no control of the affective 
valuation. So participants make their choices directly without answering the controlling 
questions.  
The second set of questionnaires, which is also composed of 100 questionnaires, 
examines SMS offers in the Moroccan telecommunication sector. Before making their 
hypothetical choices, half of the participants are asked the same three questions to control for 
the affective evaluation of the telecom offers.  Respondents choose a number from 1 two 7. 
After answering these questions, participants are asked to make hypothetical choice between 
three choices: INWI (SMS are priced at 0.5 MAD/minute, then at 0MAD/ minute), IAM/ 
Meditel (SMS were priced at 1 MAD/minute, then at 0.5 MAD/ minute), or NOTHING.  The 
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other half of the SMS questionnaires does not control for the affective valuation. So 
participants make their choices directly without answering the controlling questions. 
 
Results and Discussion: Two logistic regressions are performed with the proportions of 
subjects buying INWI and IAM/ Meditel as the dependent variables and the answers to the 
three questions as independent variables (forced-analysis conditions only). The results are 
surprising for both calls and SMS. For calls, as shown in table 7, the results suggest that there 
is no relationship between choosing INWI and preferring INWI to IAM/ Meditel. Similarly, 
preferring INWI to IAM is not related to choosing IAM / Meditel. Finally, Disliking paying 
more (in the two cases 0.5 MAD vs. 1MAD and 0MAD vs. 0.5MAD) is not related to 
choosing INWI or to choosing IAM/ Meditel offers (P-value=0.105 and 0.084 for the 
controlling question 2, and P-value=0.458 and 0.783 for the controlling question 3). 
For SMS, as shown in table 8, the results suggest also that there is no relationship 
between choosing INWI and preferring INWI to IAM/ Meditel (P-value = 0.214 for offer 1, 
and P-value =0.822 for offer 2). The regression analysis shows that disliking paying more (in 
the two cases 0.5 MAD vs. 1MAD and 0 MAD vs. 0.5 MAD) is not related to choosing INWI 
or to choosing IAM/ Meditel offers (P-value=0.117 and 0.131 for controlling question 2,  and 
P-value = 0.151 and 0.380 for controlling question 3). 
 
Table 7: Logistic Regression Output (Calls) 
CALLS Offer 1 Offer 2 
 Coefficient Z 
P-
Value 
Coefficient Z 
P-
Value 
Controlling Question 1  
(INWI vs IAM/Meditel) 
0.26 1.56 0.12 0.23 1.66 0.10 
Controlling Question 2 
 (1MAD  vs 0,5 MAD) 
0.50 1.62 0.11 0.05 0.20 0.08 
Controlling Question 3  
(0,5 MAD vs 0 MAD) 
-0.24 -0.74 0.46 -0.09 -0.27 0.78 
Constant -0.40 -0.18 0.86 1.30 0.79 0.43 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression Output (SMS) 
SMS Offer 1 Offer 2 
 Coefficient Z 
P-
Value 
Coefficient Z 
P-
Value 
Controlling Question 1 (INWI 
vs IAM/Meditel) 
0.26 1.24 0.21 0.04 0.22 0.82 
Controlling Question 2 
(1MAD  vs 0,5 MAD) 
-0.75 -1.57 0.12 -0.56 -1.51 0.13 
Controlling Question 3 
 (0,5 MAD vs 0 MAD) 
0.46 1.43 0.15 0.66 2.07 0.38 
Constant 2.06 0.82 0.41 0.41 0.18 0.86 
 
The results (as shown in Figure 11 and 12) do not support the basic affect mechanism, 
according to which the positive affect provoked by the free option drives the zero-price effect, 
but when people have access to available cognitive inputs, the zero effect disappears and 
people base their choices on a cost-benefit analysis. These results suggest that for SMS, when 
controlling for the affective evaluations, the demand for the cheaper products becomes lower 
in both conditions (cost and free condition). On the contrary, in the case of calls, after 
controlling for the affective evaluations, the demand for the cheaper products becomes higher 
in both conditions (cost and free condition).  
These results reveal that the higher attitude toward free products could not be fully 
attributed to the affect mechanism. The results of experiment 5 suggest that there is a 
difference in the attitudes toward free products between Calls and SMS even when controlling 
for the affect mechanism. A potential interpretation of these results is that the zero price affect 
might be explained by other factors rather than the affect mechanism. These factors might 
include social norms, mapping difficulty, or others. Another interpretation is that customers’ 
choices in the telecommunication sector are highly related to how telecom operators are 
perceived. So the decision to choose one operator is not as simple as choosing a chocolate as 
in the case of SMA (2007). This might explain the differences in results between this study 
and the study of SMA (2007). Finally, when controlling for the affect mechanism, there is an 
upward movement in the demand for cheaper products in the case of calls, while the demand 
for cheaper products declines as prices go down in the case of SMS. These results might be 
explained by the fact that customers might use a cost-benefit analysis in the selection of 
products, after controlling for affect. So, even when the SMS of INWI becomes for free, the 
demand for the free SMS decreases by the same amount by which the demand for the cheaper 
positive SMS decreased, which is not consistent with the zero price effect assumption. This 
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suggests that customers use different criteria to analyze different products, so the zero price 
model might have been used for chocolate while the cost-benefit analysis might be used in the 
selection process of SMS and Calls. 
 
IV. Overall Discussion and Conclusion: 
This paper starts with two models, a cost-benefit analysis model that treats zero just as 
another price and the zero price effect model which presumes that free options are evaluated 
more positively. In order to distinguish between these two approaches, experiments 1 and 2 
test for the zero price model. The results provide evidence of the validity of the zero price 
model as demand for zero price products is relatively higher. However, these results are 
somewhat different than the results of SMA (2007). SMA (2007) shows that there is a boost 
(an increase of 50%) in the demand as the cheaper product is priced at zero, and 
simultaneously a decline in the demand for the expensive product by about 30%. 
Nevertheless, this is not the case in the first two experiments in this paper. The results suggest 
that demand for the zero product increase by 22% for SMS, and just 4% for calls, as prices are 
reduced to zero. Therefore, even with the higher attitudes toward free options, a considerable 
portion of respondents choose other options rather than the zero price products. Such 
customers might be using other evaluation criteria when making their choices. Another 
potential explanation for these results is the difference between the testing products used. 
Choosing a chocolate is a much simple decision than choosing an SMS or a call, and this 
might explain the higher attitude toward free options in the study of SMA (2007).   
After demonstrating the exceptional properties of zero pricing, the paper examined a 
possible psychological cause for the zero price effect, which is the affect mechanism. SMA 
(2007) demonstrates that the zero-price effect might be better accounted for by affective 
evaluations than by social norms or mapping difficulty. So this paper tests for the affective 
evaluation as an explanation of the zero price effect. The affect mechanism consists of two 
parts. The first part suggests that free offers evoke higher positive affect, and the second 
conveys that people use this affect as an input for their decision-making process. In 
experiment 3 and 4, the paper tests for the higher positive affect evoked by free products. The 
results suggest that zero prices induce higher positive affect within customers. Experiment 5 
tests whether this positive affect is used by respondents as a cue to their decisions when 
selecting products. The results of experiment 5 do not support the affective evaluation 
hypothesis. Therefore, the zero price effect is not mainly attributed to the affective evaluation 
as suggested by SMA (2007). These results might be explained by the fact that customers 
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might use a cost-benefit analysis in the selection of products, after controlling for affect. So, 
even when the SMS of INWI became for free, the demand for these products decreased by the 
same amount in which the demand for the cheaper positive SMS decreased, which is not 
consistent with the zero price effect hypothesis. This suggests that customers use different 
criteria to analyze different products, so the zero price model might be used in buying 
chocolate while cost-benefit analysis can be used for SMS and Calls. Decisions about telecom 
operators might be associated with different perceptions and preferences. A final explanation 
of these results is that other factors might account for the zero-price effect including mapping 
difficulty, social norms, inferences about quality, and so on.  
The results of this paper suggest that zero prices lead to higher demand within free 
products. These results suggest also that the zero price affect cannot be attributed to affective 
evaluation. This work is still exposed to some limitations such as cultural biases and the 
applicability of these results to other sectors. Therefore, the zero-price model remains a 
complex model, and much additional work is needed to understand the complexities of this 
model in the marketplace. 
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Figure 7: Call Questionnaire results 
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Figure 9:SMA 2007 results 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Experiment 3 results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Experiment 4 results 
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Figure 12: Experiment 5  
SMS results 
 
Calls Results 
 
 
